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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to critically discuss the participation of sovereign wealth 
funds (SWFs) in the corporate social responsibility (CSR) programme. Sovereign Wealth 
Funds in emerging economies are involved in corporate social responsibility. However, 
concerning the 1 Malaysian Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal, this paper illustrates the 
possible use of SWF as a vehicle for corruption and abuse. 
Design/methodology/approach - The primary objective is to develop good governance practices 
of CSR by SWFs that could limit corrupt practices. A case study approach is adopted to 
investigate the CSR involvement of two SWFs – Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global 
(GPFG) and Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD).   
Findings – The finding shows that SWFs should not be directly involved in CSR. It is proposed 
that independent Non-government Organisations (NGOs), through a competitive funding 
model, could serve the CSR purpose of SWF more effectively and bring socio-economic 
changes in emerging economies.  
Originality/value - The funding model identifies the expected outcomes, priorities and uses of 
the funds. The funding committee should also be independent of the Board and transparent in 
its allocations. 
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Introduction 
The Special Issue of Public Administration and Policy (Quah, 2020) highlights the extensive 
prevalence of systemic corruption in Asia. Whilst, many cases of corruption follow the 
frequently used methods of corruption, e.g., bribery, extortion, nepotism, fraud, and 
embezzlement, the 1 Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal stands out because it 
involves the use of sovereign wealth fund (SWF), corporate social responsibility (CSR), and 
its magnitude. The 1MDB scandal has been termed as “the world’s biggest financial scandal” 
and “largest kleptocracy case” in US history because the US Department of Justice believed 
that more than US$4.5 billion was stolen from 1MDB (Ramesh, 2016; Jones, 2020). The 
1MDB Malaysian SWF scandal has received global attention as investigations and charges 
have been filed against various individuals in more than ten countries around the world for 
money laundering and corruption. In 2015, Malaysia’s then-Prime Minister Najib Razak was 
accused of channelling over RM 2.67 billion (nearly USD700 million) from 1MDB to his bank 
accounts. Since Najib Razak departed as Prime Minister after losing the 2018 general election, 
he is facing more than 42 counts of corruption and money laundering charges (Bloomberg, 
2019). It was revealed in court that a total of RM42 million from Ihsan Perdana (a CSR entity 
of 1MDB) made its way into two personal accounts of Najib between December 2014 and 
2 
 
February 2015, in three tranches of RM27 million, RM5 million, and RM10 million (Chin, 
2019). 
Similarly, Velayutham and Hasan (2019) highlighted how a CSR project of Khazanah 
Nasional was disguised as a Public-Private Partnership to circumvent numerous conflicts of 
interest in Khazanah transactions. In this case, Khazanah Nasional an SWF established in 1993 
by the Malaysian Government initiated the Malaysian Trust School Program (TSP) a 
collaboration of Yayasan Amir (a foundation set up by Khazanah) and the Malaysian Ministry 
of Education to improve access to quality education in public schools in 2010 (Yayasan Amir, 
2017). Yayasan Amir funded the programme through funding by Khazanah, other sponsors, 
and the issue of a Sukuk (Islamic Bonds), and was administered by Leap Ed (a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Khazanah) by way of a service agreement with Yayasan Amir.  
While CSR, as illustrated by the 1MDB and Khazanah Nasional cases above, is 
frequently a significant activity of SWFs and has been used to circumvent governance 
mechanisms for corruption purposes, it has received very little attention in the SWF governance 
literature. Such literature has mainly focussed on SWF investments in companies of target 
countries driven by politicians depicting SWFs as big, hostile, and uncontrollable (Gelpern, 
2011). The outcome of the pressure was the development of the SWFs: Generally Accepted 
Principles and Practices “Santiago Principles” (International Working Group of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds (IWG-SWF), 2008) voluntary code of practice for SWFs. Since the impetus for 
the code was pressure from target countries, it mainly addressed their concerns. However, as 
highlighted by Gelpern (2011), Gilson and Mailhaupt (2007), regulation of SWFs should focus 
on their activities in the host country as much as their activities in target countries.  
This paper seeks to evaluate the CSR activities of two major SWFs with extensive CSR 
activities - Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), and Abu Dhabi Fund for 
Development (ADFD). The GPFG is the largest SWF in the world; and the sister organization 
of ADFD, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority is the third largest SWF in the world. Both 
funds were set up to manage the oil wealth of the two states. Whilst they have many similarities, 
they are also very different in how the two countries are governed – in the case of Norway, a 
democracy, and Abu Dhabi an absolute monarchy. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section defines SWFs and 
provides a brief literature review of the governance of SWFs. Then, it reviews the CSR 
literature and documents the CSR activities of several SWFs around the world. The last section 
evaluates the CSR activities and their governance of CSR activities, identifying best practices, 
ended with concluding remarks. 
Regulation of sovereign wealth funds  
The Sovereign Wealth Fund Generally Accepted Principles and Practices defines SWFs as 
“special purpose investment funds or arrangements that are owned by the general government” 
(IWG-SWF, 2008, p.3). The definition explicitly excludes “foreign currency reserve assets held 
by monetary authorities for the traditional balance of payments or monetary policy purposes, 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the traditional sense, government-employee pension funds, 
or assets managed for the benefit of individuals” (IWG-SWF, 2008, p.3). These investment 
vehicles are usually funded by commodity export revenues or the transfer of assets directly 
from official foreign exchange reserves. In some cases, government budget surpluses and 
pension surpluses have also been transferred into SWFs (Butt et al., 2008). More recently, 
however, many SWFs have resorted to debt to help finance their investment activities (Bertoni 
and Lugo, 2017). 
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Al Hassan et al. (2013) identify five types of funds based on their objectives, namely: 
 
i. stabilisation funds - set up to insulate the budget and economy from commodity price 
volatility and external shocks (e.g., Chile’s Economic and Social Stabilization Fund) 
ii. savings fund – set up to share wealth across generations by transforming non-
renewable assets into diversified financial assets (e.g., Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority) 
iii. development fund - established to allocate resources to priority socio-economic 
projects, usually infrastructure (e.g., UAE’s Mubadala) 
iv. pension reserve funds - set up to meet identified outflows in the future concerning 
pension-related contingent-type liabilities on the government's balance sheet (e.g., 
Malaysia’s KWAP)  
v. reserve investment corporations - to reduce the negative carry costs of holding 
reserves or to earn a higher return on ample reserves, while the assets in the funds are 
still counted as reserves (e.g., China, South Korea, and Singapore)  
The first state SWF was established in 1953 by Kuwait and started as an operation to 
manage the country’s oil revenue surpluses through a London office, and in 1983 it was 
officially established as a public government entity called the Kuwait Investment Authority 
(KIA) (Alhashel, 2015). Today there are more than 89 SWFs managing assets worth more than 
US$ 8.4 trillion (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 2019). Currently, the largest SWF is the 
Norway Government Pension Fund Global with total assets of about US$1.2 trillion.  
The number of assets managed by SWFs has contributed to them assuming an increasingly 
high profile worldwide. With this prominence has come a host of ethical and social 
responsibilities: these range from the responsibility to balance between the interests of different 
stakeholders who might sometimes be conflicting to intergenerational competition for 
resources (Bischoff and Wood, 2019).  
Early calls for regulation of SWF were mainly from host countries of SWF investments. 
The first calls started in in early 2000 when the Dubai Ports World (DPW), a state-owned entity 
was supposed to manage six US ports as a result of its acquisition of a British company (US 
Department of Treasury, 2006), and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 
bid for the US oil company Unocal (Knowledge @Wharton, 2005). These outcries have been 
accompanied by demands for significant regulation of SWFs in target countries and greater 
transparency on the part of the SWFs. 
Gilson and Mailhaupt (2007) note that the controversy regarding the SWF equity 
investments that allow them to become significant controllers of the firm is a bit exaggerated. 
Rose (2008) argues that if SWFs wanted to make their investments politically driven instead 
of economically driven, there are various regulatory, economic, and political effects mitigating 
such risks. Rose further asserts that the US does not need more regulation but rather continued 
vigilance to protect the US from any possible political threats from SWFs. The argument 
against additional or excessive regulation is further supported by Avendano and Santiso (2009), 
Bahgat (2008), and Epstein and Rose (2009). 
The SWFs, however, had to respond to the pressure. In 2008, to address these concerns, a 
joint effort between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the “International Working 
Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG-SWF)” was formed. This collaboration represents the 
coming together of 14 principle funds including some of the largest, such as GIC Private 
Limited and Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, drafted the 24 Santiago Principles, to set out 
common international standards regarding transparency, independence, and governance which 
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SWFs might follow (IWG-SWF, 2008). These were made public after being presented to the 
IMF International Monetary Financial Committee on 11 October, 2008. Behrendt (2011a) 
observes found that the implementation of the Santiago Principles remains fragmented with a 
compliance rate between 50 and 60 percent.  
The activities of SWFs are as controversial in the host country as much as target countries 
and hence regulation of SWFs should focus on their activities in the host country as much as 
their activities in target countries (Gelpern, 2011; Gilson and Mailhaupt, 2007).  For example, 
the 1982 law that established the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) prohibits disclosure to 
the public of any information related to KIA's work, including the value of its assets under 
management. The Iraq invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent reconstitution of a new 
parliament led to the disclosure of massive asset losses within KIA due to corruption and theft 
leading to the promulgation of a new law requiring KIA to report to the parliament twice a year 
on ―all significant state investments (Murphy, 1993). 
Gilson and Mailhaupt (2007) argue that the controversies of regulating SWFs are caused 
by the friction of two concepts, state capitalism and market capitalism. Market capitalism is 
defined by minimal government intervention in the economy and by individual firms whose 
objective is to maximise their value. On the other hand, state capitalism is concerned with 
maximising the value of a country's economy as a whole and is characterised by a government 
that has a significant role in the economy. Frequently the management of SWF's has attempted 
to exploit the flexibility provided by each governance mechanism to minimise scrutiny. 
Gelpern (2011) argues that transnational hybrids such as SWFs face a four-fold challenge: 
they are accountable to constituencies at home and abroad; to the public at large, and a narrower 
set of stakeholders defined by their organisational form and business practices. Based on the 
above Gelpern (2011) identifies four dimensions or axis of accountability: internal public 
accountability - achieved within the political system of the capital-exporting state; private 
internal accountability - SWFs' duties to a subset of shareholders, creditors, or other 
stakeholders, which stem predominantly from their charters and contracts; external public 
accountability - duty of state-owned funds to adhere to international norms; and private external 
accountability - describes SWFs as subjects of host country laws and norms applicable to 
private market participants. This study focusses on the internal public accountability of SWFs. 
This section begins by defining the concept of the sovereign wealth fund (SWF). The 
authors not only classify various sources of SWF but also provide a brief historical overview 
of SWF development. It is important to explore the origin and purpose of SWF developed to 
identify the limitations restricting the potential of such a development fund's contribution to 
economic development. Critical review of past studies reveals a lack of regulation of SWFs in 
host countries. Such trend is prominent in either oil-rich monarchy, e.g., Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, 
Qatar; autocracies, e.g. Russia and China; and democracies dominated by a single political 
party, e.g. Singapore and Malaysia (Behrendt, 2011b). Scrutiny of SWFs is also frequently 
depicted by politicians in the host as undermining national champions (Velayutham, 2016). 
Therefore, this study contributes to the literature by examining the CSR aspect inherent in the 
SWF. The next section will explore the theoretical and practical aspect of the CSR model of 
SWF to cater to the socio-economic issues eminent in emerging economies.   
Corporate social responsibility of sovereign wealth funds 
CSR has always been a controversial topic with arguments for and against it (Carroll and 
Shabana, 2010). The case against CSR frequently begins with the classical economic argument 
made by Milton Friedman in the late 1970s, i.e., management has one responsibility, and that 
is to maximise the profits of its owners or shareholders. Friedman (1970) argued that social 
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issues are not the concern of business people and that these problems should be resolved by 
either the unfettered workings of the free market system; or if the free market cannot solve the 
social problems, it falls upon government and legislation to do the job. He also observes that 
business is not the best institution equipped to handle social activities. It is also pointed out that 
shareholders, rather than managers, should be the right decision-makers on social activities.  
The agency view makes the case that investment in CSR is simply a representation of 
agency problems within the firm and would be value-destroying. Bénabou and Tirole (2010) 
argue that in cases where CSR is initiated by management, it comes at a cost to corporations. 
Masulis and Reza (2014) found that a high percentage of firms contribute to charitable 
organisations affiliated in some manner with the CEO. They find several instances where CSR 
appears to benefit the CEO in some way, and thus that corporate philanthropy is not just a way 
to maximise firm value; agency problems between managers and shareholders come into play. 
The above supports the argument of Behrendt (2011b) that SWFs managed by authoritarian 
governments are distinguished by a lack of public oversight and are instead tightly controlled 
by the current political leadership, and this allows governments more flexibility in using 
financial assets to pursue immediate political agendas. 
Arguments in favour of CSR is based on the belief that it is in business's long-term self-
interest to be socially responsible. The standard explanation for why companies invest in CSR 
is that doing so enhances profitability and firm value; a relationship often referred to as “doing 
well by doing good” (e.g., Dowell et al., 2000; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Renneboog et al., 2008a; 
Renneboog et al., 2011; Krueger, 2015). Other studies consider the inverse, that is, “doing good 
by doing well,” by examining whether it is only well-performing firms that can afford to invest 
in CSR (e.g., Hong et al., 2012). The third argument in favour of CSR is that it will 'ward off 
government regulation' (Carroll and Shabana, 2010). Liang and Renneboog (2017), for 
example, found that there is a strong link between firm-level CSR and country-level legal 
origin, which may help explain cross-country variation in CSR.  
Whereas CSR focuses on the way firms conduct Business, Socially Responsible 
Investing (SRI) encompasses the judgment of potential investments on specific social and 
ethical criteria in portfolio management. If more and more funds adopt SRI practices, it is 
argued that this will put pressure on firms to incorporate CSR into decision-making (Sparkes 
and Cowton, 2004). SRI becomes relevant in the screening of investments, where managers 
evaluate possible target firms on whether they adhere to specific CSR standards (Renneboog 
et al., 2008b). 
The prominence of SWFs in their home country requires them to maintain their 
legitimacy in both the home countries as well as investment destination countries. To maintain 
their legitimacy, they have frequently embarked on CSR activities and socially responsible 
investments (SRI). A review of the top ten SWFs (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 2019) 
found that only one is located in Europe (Norway Government Pension Fund Global (Norway 
GPFG)) and the rest are located in Asia or the Middle East. SRI has not been a significant issue 
or concern in Asia or the Middle East, and hence only Norway GPFG has clear policies on SRI. 
The other top ten SWF has no clear statement on SRI but rather have extensive statements on 
their CSR activities. 
The other top SWFs reports mainly focus on their CSR activities. The Kuwait 
Investment Authority’s (KIA) (the oldest and fourth-biggest SWF) main CSR program 
involves training programs predominantly for locals but also regional capacity development. 
These mainly include MBA scholarships, and the IMF Middle East Centre for Economics and 
Finance (Kuwait Investment Authority, 2019). The China Investment Corporation (CIC) the 
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second biggest SWF is involved in various poverty eradication efforts in various provinces in 
China (China Investment Corporation, 2018). In the case of the Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority (ADIA) the third-largest Fund, there is little information on its CSR activities. 
However, the Abu Dhabi government has established a separate Abu Dhabi Fund for 
Development with a mission to help developing countries to achieve sustainable economic 
growth and reduce poverty. It does this by providing concessionary financial resources in the 
form of loans. 
Closer to Malaysia Singapore owned SWF, Temasek Holdings has established the 
Temasek Foundation to deliver community programs in Singapore and Temasek Trust to 
provide governance and financial oversight for the endowment beneficiaries. Another 
Singapore owned SWF the Government Investment Corporation also the sixth-largest SWF 
funds several CSR projects like the sparks and smiles and the Purple Symphony. 
CSR by Norway’s GPFG and Abu Dhabi’s ADFD  
The problem of CSR by SWFs is similar to the controversies of regulating SWFs which is 
caused by the friction of two concepts, public governance and corporate governance. The 
merits of public governance and corporate governance have been discussed extensively, and 
each has been ascendant at different times (Gruening, 2001; Benz and Frey, 2007; Hirigoen 
and Laouer, 2013). In the early 1980s, the New Public Management literature advocated the 
adoption of the market and corporate practices by government entities (Gruening, 2001). These 
practices were first adopted in the United Kingdom under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
and in the municipal governments in the US (e.g., Sunnyvale, California) that had suffered 
heavily from economic recession and tax revolts. The significant characteristics included 
privatisation and competition in public service provision, customer focus, decentralisation and 
the separation of funding and provision of services (Hood, 1991; Stewart and Walsh, 1992; 
Borins, 1995; Boston et al., 1996). 
Following the global financial crisis, Benz and Frey (2007) argue that corporate 
governance can learn from public governance. Institutions devised to control and discipline the 
behaviour of executives in the political sphere can give new insights into how to improve the 
governance of firms. Hirigoen and Laouer (2013) argue that there is a convergence of corporate 
and public governance. The difference between public and corporate governance stems from 
the objectives of each. The objectives of corporate governance are particular and measurable, 
i.e. shareholder wealth maximisation (Friedman, 1970); in contrast to the objectives of public 
governance which is more nebulous and therefore has no precise measurement, i.e., public 
wellbeing. Because the corporate governance objectives are more specific and measurable, the 
executive is given more freedom to achieve the objectives; in contrast, public governance has 
mainly been about control. Light (1993) points out that this term has long been narrowly 
defined as “limit[ing] bureaucratic discretion through compliance with tightly drawn rules and 
regulations” (p.12). 
As pointed out earlier SWFs are hybrids and hence appear to frequently have not such 
clear objectives because they are controlled by the state and funded from public funds, but with 
freedom of corporates, hence SWFs becoming a significant preference of autocratic regimes, 
providing them with considerable scope for corruption and abuse. SWFs should be responsible 
for investing in tax-payers funds effectively, and the returns on the investment should be 
returned to the government for allocation to public interest projects which do not seem to 
happen in many countries with SWFs. 
This section evaluates the CSR activities and governance of CSR activities of two major 
SWFs – Norway's GPFG, Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD). The GPFG is the largest 
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SWF in the world, and the sister organization of ADFD, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 
is the third largest SWF in the world. Both funds were set up to manage the oil wealth of the 
two states. Whilst they have many similarities, they are also very different in that the two 
countries are governed very differently – in the case of Norway a democracy and Abu Dhabi 
an absolute monarchy. 
Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) 
The GPFG was established in 1990 through an Act of parliament to shield the economy from 
ups and downs in oil revenue. It also serves as a financial reserve and as a long-term savings 
plan so that both current and future generations get to benefit from the oil wealth. Whilst, the 
first money was transferred in 1996, it grew rapidly to become the largest SWF in the World 
with total assets of US$1.2 trillion. The fund is managed by the Norges Bank Investment 
Management. The GPFG does not have CSR activities but rather practices Responsible 
Investments, i.e., CSR is subsumed in its investment practices. The GPFG has seven major 
sustainable expectations (based on internationally recognised principles such as the UN Global 
Compact, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the G20/OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance, and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises) 
of all companies it invests:   
a. Protection of Children’s rights - companies to respect children’s rights in their business 
operations and supply chains, community interactions and the marketing and use of 
their products and services 
b. Climate change – companies to pursue sustainable policies and disclosure the climate 
impact of their activities 
c. Water Management - effective management of water sustainability and risks 
d. Human Rights – respect for human rights in all business activities 
e. Tax Transparency – companies to avoid aggressive tax behaviour and be transparent 
about where they generate economic value 
f. Anti-Corruption - companies to identify and manage corruption risk, and to report 
publicly on their anti-corruption effort 
g. Sustainable use of the Ocean – companies to have policies and practices to minimise 
the degradation of the ocean 
The Fund has detailed published expectations of companies for each of its seven major 
expectations and is available on its website (https://www.nbim.no/en/publications/). All seven 
documents require companies to: 
i. Integrate expectation into policies and strategies 
ii. Integrate expectation risk into risk management 
iii. Disclose material expectation information 
iv. Engage transparently and responsibly on the expectation 
Based on the above expectations the Ministry of Finance has developed a set of Ethical 
Guidelines for the observation and exclusion of companies from the Funds Portfolio to be 
implemented by a Council on Ethics, which is appointed and reports independently to the 
Ministry of Finance. The role of the Council on Ethics for the Government Pension Fund 
Global (GPFG) is to evaluate whether or not the Fund's investment in specified companies is 
inconsistent with its Ethical Guidelines. The guidelines contain both product-based exclusion 
criteria, such as the production of tobacco, coal or certain types of weapons, and conduct based 
exclusion criteria, such as corruption, human rights violations, environmental damage and 
unacceptably high greenhouse gas emissions. The Council consists of five members and is 
supported by a secretariat. The Council’s recommendations on the companies to be excluded 
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are published on the Council's website including the reasons for the exclusion (Council on 
Ethics, 2020). In addition to the above disclosures, Norges Bank also publishes its investment 
in all the individual companies, allowing scrutiny by the public. 
The Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) 
The Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) was established in 1971 to help 
developing countries to achieve sustainable economic growth and reduce poverty (Abu Dhabi 
Fund for Development, 2020). To do so it provides concessionary financial resources in the 
form of sovereign loans. In 2019 for example the fund provided US$1.2 billion in 
concessionary loans and US$235 million in development grants. The fund is administered by 
a Board of Directors that is responsible for directing and supervising the fund's development 
and investment activities, including deciding on its lending requests, identifying investments 
and applying corporate governance. 
The ADFD publishes its guidelines on the submission of funding applications, funding 
eligibility and funding process on its website. The ADFD only accepts funding applications 
from mainly government entities and semi-government entities or private companies with a 
government guarantee. The application must be for an infrastructure project, e.g., energy, 
water, transportation, health, housing or education; from a developing country; and the project 
must fall within the government's developmental priorities, and the project must have a positive 
socio-economic impact. Also, requests need to be supported by an economic feasibility study 
and projected cash flows.   
The funding process has identified steps that include: 
1. Review of application documents 
2. Initial assessment 
3. Project appraisal 
4. Loan approval 
The Fund publishes the projects that have been funded including a brief description, the 
year, and the country. The ADFD Annual report 2019 includes individual projects funded in 
the year including the amount, the type of funding, e.g., concessionary loans, grants. 
Best practices 
The two cases illustrate major differences in approach but many similarities in practices that 
provide a basis for the development of best practices. The major difference is that CSR is 
subsumed in GPFG's investment policies while CSR is practised separately and independently 
of its investment policy. A review of SWFs, as well as private companies' practices, would 
indicate the second approach is more common because the fund is free to maximise the returns 
on its investment regardless of the sustainability or ethics of the companies it invests in. CSR 
from this perspective is used as a means of cleansing its sins or corporate conscience. Also, to 
practising an investment policy that is based on ethics and sustainability, the Council on Ethics 
of the GPFG is promoting and facilitating CSR globally through its practice of publishing the 
names and reasons for companies excluded from its portfolio – a form of naming and shaming 
companies to encourage them to be more sustainable and ethical, i.e., promoting CSR through 
investments and negative sanctions.  
The review of the CSR activities of GPFG and ADFD also highlights several best 
practices that should be adopted by SWF's in their CSR activities to minimise conflicts of 
interest and corruption. First, in GPFG and ADFD, the SWF is separated from the CSR funder 
or CSR guardian, and the CSR funder does not report to the SWF. As pointed out earlier in 
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Abu Dhabi, the SWF is the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, and the CSR arm of Abu Dhabi 
is the ADFD and both reports independently to the government. In the case of Norway, the 
SWF is Norway GPFG managed by Norges Bank, and the implementer of its SRI framework 
is the Council on Ethics, each appointed and reports independently to the Ministry of Finance.  
The second characteristic is that they fund CSR project but do not operate the CSR 
projects, i.e., they are not directly involved in delivering CSR because the scope for abuse is 
unlimited. In the case of ADFD, it does not deliver CSR but funds CSR and in the case of the 
GPFG, it practices Socially Responsible Investments (SRI). Besides, the GPFG does not take 
controlling stakes in companies but rather small investments.  In the case of ADFD its funding 
can be in the form of investment in companies that play a vital role in stimulating economic 
growth and creating job opportunities, and development funding through long term 
development loans with concessionary interest rates. The two organizations also focus on CSR 
that that is sustainable, i.e., the projects or investment do not require continuous cash infusion 
as in the case of the Trust School project, but rather self-sustaining and frequently able to return 
the initial investment which could be used to fund new CSR projects. 
The third characteristic is that they have clear criteria for funding. Both ADFD and 
GPFG have explicitly stated criteria. In the case of ADFD, the application must be for an 
infrastructure project, e.g., energy, water, transportation; from a developing country; project 
falls within the government's developmental priorities; and requests need to be supported by 
an economic feasibility study and projected cash flows. In the case of GPFG, the guidelines for 
observation and exclusion have explicit statements and targets, e.g., observation or exclusion 
may be decided for mining companies and power producers which themselves or through 
entities, they control and derive 30 percent or more of their income from thermal coal 
(Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, 2019).   
Fourth, both the GPFG and ADFD have transparent funding or investment process 
which includes deadlines for applications, assessment and approvals for the ADFD. In the case 
of the ADFD, it also gets involved in project management through direct supervision. The 
ADFD fund recipients are expected to provide progress and final reports on how the money 
was spent and benefits to society. In the case of the GPFG, Norges Bank has published voting 
principles and guidelines that it practices at company AGMs and in some cases publishes its 
voting intentions ahead of AGMs.  
Fifth, there is a public announcement of the recipients and the amount awarded. The 
Norway GPFG reports Fund's investments by country, asset class and sector and the individual 
companies. Similarly, the Council on Ethics reports on all excluded companies in its annual 
report.  
Conclusion 
Most SWFs are involved in CSR, but as the 1 Malaysian Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal 
illustrates that it can also be a vehicle for corruption and abuse. The abuse of CSR has received 
very little attention in the SWF governance literature because the SWF governance literature 
has mainly focussed on the regulation of foreign direct investments by SWFs. The paper 
highlights the primary reason for this is that the scrutiny of SWFs has mainly been by countries 
receiving investments by SWFs and minimal scrutiny at home because many of the SWFs are 
located in either oil-rich monarchy, e.g., Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Qatar; autocracies, e.g. Russia 
and China; and democracies dominated by a single political party, e.g. Singapore and Malaysia 
(Behrendt, 2011b). Scrutiny of SWFs is also frequently depicted by politicians in a host as 
undermining national champions.  
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This paper is based on an in-depth study of CSR involvement of two SWFs - GPFG 
and ADFD seek to develop good governance practices of CSR by SWFs and remedy the deficit 
in the SWF governance literature. It is recommended that the SWF should be separated from 
the CSR funder, and the CSR funder should not have primary accountability to the SWF. While 
SWFs can serve as the funding source for the CSR project, it is recommended that SWFs do 
not operate the CSR projects to ensure an optimum level of fund utilization. However, CSR 
projects need to have clear criteria for funding. SWFs also have the responsibility to ensure a 
transparent funding process preferably through a competitive process. SWFs could improve 
the transparency of the funding process by making such information publicly accessible. 
Findings and policy recommendation provided in this study could serve as a guidance 
mechanism for the regulatory authority. SWFs have a much bigger role to bring positive socio-
economic change for emerging economies and the effective use of the CSR function can foster 
such change through the participation of both government and non-government agencies.     
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